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Abstract 
What is the “growth penalty” when a country’s entrepreneurship deviates from its 
optimal level? We use data on entrepreneurship for a panel of developed and developing 
countries over 2003-2011 to estimate growth equations.  We treat the impact of 
entrepreneurship on real GDP growth as heterogeneous across countries. The 
methodology accounts for unobserved heterogeneity among countries in the optimal 
entrepreneurship rate and other factors affecting growth.  In less developed countries, 
there is not enough entrepreneurship, and increases in the entrepreneurship rate have a 
sizeable positive effect on growth. In high income countries, entrepreneurship appears 
to be close to the optimum. We also explore how the growth penalty varies across 
countries. Higher levels of R&D capability decrease the growth penalty of having too few 
entrepreneurs, suggesting that R&D and entrepreneurship are substitutes.  Corruption 
increases the opportunity cost of having a suboptimal entrepreneurship level, a finding 
that is in accord with the hypothesis that corruption can “grease the wheels” of 
commerce by speeding up bureaucratic processes. Countries with greater 
entrepreneurial capability suffer a higher growth penalty: the higher the ability of the 
marginal entrepreneur, the higher is the opportunity cost to the economy of not taking 
advantage of her talents.
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1 Introduction  
In recent decades there has been growing interest in the role of entrepreneurship in 
stimulating economic growth in knowledge economies. Small and medium-sized 
companies play a vital role in the modern entrepreneurial economy, in conjunction with 
the ICT revolution, globalization, and changes in organizational structure and the 
competitive milieu after the transformation of managed economies (Audretsch & Thurik 
2001, 2002; Thurik et al. 2011). While the literature strongly suggests that 
entrepreneurship contributes to growth in developed nations (Robbins et al. 2000; 
Audretsch & Thurik1; Mueller 2007; Acs et al. 2012), less is known about the role of 
entrepreneurs in middle and low income nations. The relationship between 
entrepreneurship and growth in less developed countries (LDCs) is complex.1   If 
entrepreneurship is identified with self-employment, then it is negatively correlated with 
income per capita (Acs 2006), largely because LDCs have many self-employed individuals 
and low income.  The real question, which the simple correlation cannot answer, is 
whether increasing (appropriately defined) entrepreneurial activity within a country 
would increase economic growth.  The present study indicates that developing nations 
are still below their optimal levels of entrepreneurship.  
We investigate whether a country suffers a “growth penalty” when 
                                                         
1 We use the term LDC to refer generically to low and middle income countries.  
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entrepreneurship deviates from its optimal level. Following Audretsch et al. (2002), we 
estimate growth equations that allow each country to have its own optimal rate of 
entrepreneurship. Deviations from the optimal level of entrepreneurial activity—in 
either direction—lower national output from its potential, negatively impacting growth.  
Unlike Audretsch et al. (2002), who examine OECD countries, we include developed and 
developing countries in our examination.  Our data on entrepreneurship, from the 
Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM), cover a more recent period (2003-2011) than 
previous studies.  We also extend the literature by treating the impact of 
entrepreneurship on growth as heterogeneous across countries and by exploring some 
sources of the differences in impact. The methodology accounts for unobserved country- 
and year-specific confounding factors in determinants of the level and growth rate of 
real national output per capita, including the unobserved optimal rate of 
entrepreneurship and differing initial stages of development.   
We show that in LDCs and middle-income countries, entrepreneurship appears to be 
below its optimal level.  Notwithstanding that LDCs generally have more of their 
population running nascent small firms—the definition of entrepreneurship adopted in 
this study—than in developed countries, a marginal increase in the entrepreneurship 
rate in LDCs has a positive effect on growth. On the contrary, in high income countries, 
the empirical results suggest that entrepreneurship is close to its desirable level.  
We also explore how the growth penalty varies with characteristics of the country, 
allowing us to test theories in the literature regarding the relationship between 
entrepreneurship and growth. We show that higher levels of R&D capability decrease 
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the growth penalty of having too few entrepreneurs, suggesting that entrepreneurship 
and R&D are substitutes (Braunerhjelm et al. 2010).  Higher levels of corruption also 
appear to increase the opportunity cost of having a suboptimal entrepreneurship level.  
The finding is in accord with the hypothesis that corruption can “grease the wheels” and 
speed up bureaucratic processes (Aidt 2003; Méon & Weill 2010), which may be 
especially important for entrepreneurs starting new enterprises and bringing new 
products and services to market.  Finally, the results also suggest that countries with 
higher perceived entrepreneurial capability suffer a higher growth penalty when the 
right amount of that talent is not tapped. The higher the ability of the marginal 
entrepreneur, the higher is the opportunity cost of not taking advantage of her talents in 
the economy. 
The next section reviews some of the relevant literature on entrepreneurship and 
economic growth.  The data for the empirical study are described in section 3, and the 
econometric methodology is introduced in section 4.  The empirical results are 
discussed in section 5, and the final section contains concluding discussion on the 
findings and import of the work. 
2 Entrepreneurship and Growth 
Economists have long known that modern national economic growth cannot fully be 
explained by growth in the usage of inputs such as labor, land, and capital alone (Solow 
1957).  Empirical work in the last 40 years shows that R&D, technical change, and 
investment in human capital are needed to produce a fertile environment for economic 
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growth (Barro 2000; Durluaf et al. 2005; Eberhardt & Teal 2011). More recently, 
attention has turned to the role of the entrepreneur in seizing opportunities in this 
dynamic environment to produce growth. The entrepreneur’s creation of new market 
niches provides the link to growth (Holcombe 1998). 
To define entrepreneurship for purposes of this study, begin with two related 
individuals:  the small business owner and the Schumpeterian entrepreneur. Not all 
small businesses are entrepreneurial and not all entrepreneurship takes place in small 
firms.  However, when the two concepts overlap, they are of great importance to the 
economy (Wennekers & Thurik 1999; Thurik et al. 2002). The small entrepreneurial firm 
is especially important in developing countries, whether one look to the past in the US or 
LDCs today.  In less developed markets characterized by imperfections in coverage and 
institutions, an important role of the small entrepreneur is to fill gaps in markets. This 
requires discovering opportunities and being willing to be the ultimate risk-bearer 
(Leibenstein 1968). The entrepreneur as gap-filler and risk-bearer is especially important 
to economic growth in developing nations, where “routinized market mechanisms” do 
not exist and new ideas must often self-financed (Leff 1979). A Schumpeterian view of 
entrepreneurship also implies intense and continuous competition between new 
products and ideas that leads to the selection of the best option (Wennekers & Thurik 
1999). Finally, some empirical research shows that identifying entrepreneurship with 
self-employment alone may lead to misleading results, since self-employment is 
negatively associated with economic growth in some samples (Salgado-Banda 2007).  
Given these considerations, we focus on the entrepreneur as the starter and owner of 
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new businesses. 
2.1 The Size of the Firm and Stages of Economic Development 
 The role of the small entrepreneur changes with the level of development of an 
economy.  To paint economic history with a broad brush, one can distinguish three 
stages in the relationship between the structure of the industry and economic 
development. Until the industrial revolution, self-employment was the norm in Western 
countries and the majority of people worked in agriculture (Acs 2006). The second stage 
begin with the transition to modern industrial economies, where the implementation of 
large scale projects coupled with the growth in production and volume of transactions 
required larger firms.  During this period, up to the 1970’s, entrepreneurial activity 
became increasingly identified with large firms (Chandler 1990; Thurik, Wennekers, and 
Uhlaner 2002).  The theoretical literature describing the relationship between the size 
of the firm and country income level during this period, beginning with Lucas (1978), 
predicts that the average size of firms increases with progressive economic development. 
Congregado et al. (2012, p.7) explain the microfoundations of Lucas’s hypothesis: “higher 
capital per capita ratios raise the opportunity costs of managing a firm (i.e., wages) 
relative to the marginal managerial rents, which, in turn, would lead ‘marginal’ managers 
(entrepreneurs) to become employees and reduce entrepreneurship activities.” 
The third stage of industry structure and development began with the reversal of 
the trend towards centralization, identified by Blau (1987) as beginning in the mid-1970s. 
The shift from a “managed to an entrepreneurial economy” (Audretsch & Thurik 2001) 
revived the importance and prevalence (Loveman & Sengenberger 1991; Acs & 
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Audretsch 1993) of the small entrepreneur. The development of new information and 
communication technology reduced or eliminated the efficiency advantages of large 
corporations, allowing nimbler and more flexible small organizations to thrive in the new 
economy (Carlsson 1989).  
2.2 The Differing Contributions of Small Entrepreneurs and Larger Incumbents 
The evolution of the role of the small firm in the economy points out that empirical 
analyses looking for monotonic effects of entrepreneurship on growth are likely to be 
misspecified.  The optimal fraction of individuals devoted to entrepreneurship in the 
economy is neither zero nor one.  While large incumbent firms produce the most new 
knowledge through R&D (Scherer 1992), by taking advantage of scale and scope in R&D, 
the Schumpeterian entrepreneur is required to turn knowledge into profitable business 
activity (Schumpeter 1911; Braunerhjelm et al. 2010). 
The necessity of both entrepreneurship and larger incumbent firms implies an 
interior equilibrium in the entrepreneurship rate. As Wennekers and Thurik (1999) 
discuss, when there are too few small, innovative business owners, competition in the 
economy may suffer, with attendant loss of efficiency.  With too many small 
entrepreneurial firms, on the other hand, the average scale of production will be 
inefficiently low.  Thus we follow Audretsch et al. (2002), Carree et al. (2002) and 
Carree et al. (2007) in adopting an empirical model that accounts for an interior optimal 
entrepreneurship rate and therefore potentially nonmonotonic effects on growth of the 
actual entrepreneurship rate. 
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2.3 The Contribution of Entrepreneurship to Growth and Unemployment 
Many empirical studies measure the contribution of entrepreneurship rates to 
subsequent economic growth in OECD countries. Such research generally finds positive 
association between entrepreneurship and higher productivity that is robust to different 
model specifications and periods (Robbins et al. 2000; Audretsch & Thurik 2001; Mueller 
2007; Braunerhjelm et al. 2010; Acs et al. 2012).  
The literature quantifying the impact of entrepreneurship on growth in developing 
nations is smaller but growing rapidly due to the availability of new datasets. McMillan & 
Woodruff (2002) found that job creation was one of the main contributions of new firms 
to the growth of transition economies. Several studies use earlier waves of the same 
data studied here, GEM. Van Stel et al. (2005) find the total entrepreneurship rate (TEA) 
to be positively associated with growth in rich countries and inversely correlated with 
growth in low income countries. Valliere & Peterson (2009) find that high-growth 
entrepreneurs contribute to growth in developed countries only. Our conclusions differ 
from those of these authors.  Once we control for differences among countries in the 
optimal industry structure and for unobserved country- and year-specific growth factors, 
we find evidence that more entrepreneurship stimulates growth in LDCs. Wong et al. 
(2005) find that high-growth entrepreneurship contributes to growth regardless of 
income level.   
Our methodology is most similar to a set of papers examining whether there is a 
growth penalty for countries that have not adjusted towards the optimal industry 
structure. In their sample of seventeen European countries between 1990 and 1994, 
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Audretsch et al. (2002) find evidence that countries that shifted away from large firms 
experienced higher growth rates. Carree et al. (2002) reach similar conclusions for a 
sample of 23 OECD countries between 1976 and 1996. Finally, Carree et al. (2007) 
examine OECD countries further and conclude that the growth penalty exists only for 
countries where entrepreneurial activity is below the optimal level. 
3 Description of the Data 
The variable of interest for this study is the rate of entrepreneurship in a country, 
taken from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM).2 GEM surveys collect data from 
individuals around the world regarding entrepreneurial activity, and include countries 
across the range of national income, although coverage is more complete for developed 
nations. We use nationally aggregated data for 2001-2011 from 53 countries (the most 
allowed by the availability of data), although data are not observed for all years for some 
countries. Of the nine years used for estimation,3 there is an average of 5.1 observations 
per country.  The countries are placed into low, middle,4 and high income groups using 
a set of indicators for the level of development of the country at the beginning of the 
sample (taken from the World Bank).5  Three of the countries included have low income, 
                                                         
2 See http://www.gemconsortium.org.  
3 Although the data begin in 2001, given the double difference specification adopted below the first 
year in the estimation sample is 2003. 
4 Our middle income category conflates the World Bank’s lower and upper middle income categories. 
5 World Bank Country Classification published in July 2012. See 
http://www.healthsystemsglobal.org/Portals/0/files/World_bank_list_july2012.pdf 
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and the rest are roughly evenly split between middle and high income levels (see Table 
1). Our main variable of interest is the total early-stage entrepreneurial activity (TEA), 
defined as the percentage of subpopulation aged 18-64 who are nascent entrepreneurs 
or who own and manage a new business.6 The outcome of interest for the estimations is 
the growth rate of GDPPC, the per capita gross domestic product, expressed in terms of 
purchasing power parity (PPP, constant international 2005 currency), taken from the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI).7  
Other variables are included in the study to model the heterogeneity of the growth 
penalty.  The first country-level variable we use is the log number of R&D researchers 
per million people (RDworker, from WDI).  RDworker is a proxy for the R&D capacity or 
capability in the economy.8  We measure corruption in the country with a transformed 
index from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG).9 Higher values of the variable, 
                                                         
6 A nascent entrepreneur is one who is actively involved in starting a business , and the enterprise has 
paid salaries, wages, or other payments to the owners for three months or fewer.  A new business is 
defined as an active enterprise that has paid salaries, wages, or other payments to the owners for 
between three and 42 months.  See survey definitions at 
http://www.gemconsortium.org/docs/download/414.  
7 See http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators. 
8 We use RDworkers instead of actual performed R&D or the stock of R&D to focus on the capacity to 
do R&D and to avoid potential issues with endogeneity and reverse causality. 
9 The ICRG index assesses corruption within the political system, including “demands for special 
payments and bribes connected with import and export licenses, exchange controls, tax assessments, 
police protection, or loans,” as well as “actual or potential corruption in the form of excessive 
patronage, nepotism, job reservations, ‘favor-for-favors’, secret party funding, and suspiciously close 
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corruption, indicate more corruption; the variable is centered at zero and scaled so that 
it has unit standard deviation.10  The final variable used to model heterogeneity in the 
growth penalty is the perceived capabilities of entrepreneurs, collected by the GEM. This 
variable, EshipAbility, is defined as the percentage of subpopulation aged 18-64 who 
believe they have the required skills and knowledge to start a business.11 
Figure 1 illustrates the mean rate of entrepreneurship (TEA) by income level in the 
sample. Lower income countries tend to have more of their working age population 
engaged in entrepreneurship than in middle income countries, although given the small 
size of the low income sample there is a high degree of variation. Over all years, TEA 
averages 16.9% in low income countries and 10.7% in middle income countries.  Middle 
income nations have more entrepreneurs than high income countries on average, 
although there are some notable exceptions to the latter general comparison. Whereas 
TEA averages 6.5% for the high income group, the entrepreneurship rate of six of those 
nations (Australia, Canada, Iceland, New Zealand, South Korea, and the United States) is 
greater than 10%.  TEA for six middle-income nations is below 6% (Croatia, Malaysia, 
Romania, Russia, South Africa, and Turkey).  
Summary statistics by income level for all variables used in the estimations are in 
Table 2.  Growth in national output per capita averages 2.8% for low income countries 
during this time, 2.5% for middle income countries, and 1.1% for the high income group.  
                                                                                                                                                                  
ties between politics and business” (PRS Group, http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG_methodology.aspx).  
10 The original variable ranged from one to six and had lower values for more corrupt countries. 
11 Refer to footnote 6 for the source for the definition. 
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The entrepreneurship rate also grows on average for each income group, with higher 
growth in TEA the higher is national income.  High income countries have the lowest 
levels of corruption and perceived capability for entrepreneurship and the highest 
percentage of workers engaged in research. 
4 Empirical strategy 
In this section the foundation for the empirical work is described.  We base our 
empirical analysis on extensions to the growth penalty model developed by Audretsch et 
al. (2002). Denote the one-year change in log(GDPPC) for country i in year t as yit.  Then 
national output growth is modeled as a function of yit*, the economic growth rate when 
entrepreneurship is at its optimal rate, a growth penalty caused by any deviation from 
the optimal industry structure TEAi*, and an econometric error term: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ − 𝛾|log 𝑇𝐸𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 − log 𝑇𝐸𝐴𝑖
∗| + (𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡) (1) 
TEA is lagged one period both to avoid problems of endogeneity and because it takes 
time for the impact of changes in industrial structure to affect national output.  TEAi* is 
the entrepreneurship rate that maximizes growth.  TEAi* is assumed to be constant 
within a country during the short time period studied here, but can differ freely among 
countries. Parameter γ is positive if growth depends on industry structure at all, by 
definition of TEAi*.  The form of the growth penalty term in equation (1) implies that 
output growth declines linearly with deviation to either side of the optimal TEA.  Given 
the use of logs within the absolute value bars in equation (1), the deviation is expressed 
in approximate percentage terms.  The error term in equation (1) consists of a 
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country-specific term 𝛼𝑖  and a mean-zero residual 𝜀𝑖𝑡  incorporating idiosyncratic 
deviations from mean output growth conditional on the regressors and 𝛼𝑖.  Parameter 
𝛼𝑖 captures all unobserved growth factors unique to the nation that do not change over 
time, such as the initial income level of the country, which has been found to be an 
important determinant of growth in the macroeconomic literature on the convergence 
hypothesis (e.g., Barro 1991; de la Fuente 1997).  
Taking the first difference of the equation above cancels the unobserved optimal 
entrepreneurship rate and all the other unobserved country-specific factors captured in 
αi.  The first difference is expressed as follows: 
Δ𝑦𝑖𝑡 = Δ𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ − 𝛾(|log 𝑇𝐸𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 − log 𝑇𝐸𝐴𝑖
∗| − |log 𝑇𝐸𝐴𝑖𝑡−2 − log 𝑇𝐸𝐴𝑖
∗|) + Δ𝜀𝑖𝑡) (2) 
As long as the economy in country i does not leapfrog the optimal entrepreneurship rate 
from one year to the next, the expressions within the absolute value bars have the same 
sign and equation (2) can be written as: 
Δ𝑦𝑖𝑡 = Δ𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ + 𝜅Δ log 𝑇𝐸𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 + Δ𝜀𝑖𝑡 (3) 
where 𝜅 = 𝛾 sgn(𝑇𝐸𝐴𝑖
∗ − 𝑇𝐸𝐴𝑖⋅). Whereas γ is positive, the sign of κ is determined by 
whether entrepreneurial activity in a country is above or below its optimal level.  If 
TEAit-1 and TEAit-2 are less than TEAi*, then κ is positive. Conversely, if entrepreneurship is 
above its optimal level, κ is negative. Thus, estimates of κ can be used to infer whether 
the actual entrepreneurship rate is above or below its unobserved optimal level. The size 
of κ indicates the marginal effect of any deviation from the optimal industry structure 
on economic growth.  
Small and statistically insignificant estimates of κ  likely indicate that 
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entrepreneurship is close to its optimal level. There are two reasons for this.  When 
TEAit is close to TEAi* during the sample period, it must be the case that there is little 
variation in TEAit, since TEAi* is time-constant.  Regressors with little variation have 
larger standard errors in their estimates, and are less likely to be significant.  
Furthermore, one can view the parameterization of the growth penalty in equation (1) as 
an approximation (adopted for convenience to difference out the unobserved quantities) 
to the true functional form for how the term (TEAit - TEAi*) enters the growth equation.  
If the true growth penalty is differentiable at TEAit = TEAi*, as one may well expect, then 
by definition its derivative (the marginal impact of a deviation from optimal 
entrepreneurship rate) is zero there.  Therefore a small estimate of κ in our model may 
reflect that TEAit is close to TEAi* 
Equation (3) is not directly estimable because the optimal growth rate 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗  is not 
observed.  If within any year 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗  is the same for all countries at approximately the 
same level of development, then we can replace the first term on the right side of 
equation (3) with a set of indicator variables for the year interacted with a set of 
indicator variables for the initial income level of the country. This leads to an equation 
feasible for use in our first estimation: 
Δ𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿𝑔𝑡 + 𝜅Δ log 𝑇𝐸𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 + Δ𝜀𝑖𝑡 (4) 
where 𝛿𝑔𝑡 is a fixed effect for income group g (= low, mid, high) in year t. 
We relax the assumption that κ is homogenous across countries in our second 
specification.  It may be the case that some nations have too much entrepreneurship 
while others have too little.  The discussion in section 2.1 suggests that the optimal 
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entrepreneurship rate varies with the level of development.  Replacing κ in equation (4) 
with income-group specific parameters allows us to examine how the growth penalty 
varies by stage of development across upper, middle and low income countries: 
Δ𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿𝑔𝑡 + 𝜅𝑔Δ log 𝑇𝐸𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 + Δ𝜀𝑖𝑡 (5) 
Finally, in our third specification we model directly the heterogeneity in the growth 
penalty by writing κ as a function of a vector of time-constant12 national level covariates 
Zi and an independent mean-zero error term ν𝑖: 
𝜅𝑖 = 𝜋′𝑍𝑖 + ν𝑖 ≡ ?̅?𝑖 + ν𝑖 (6) 
Substituting equation (6) into equation (4) yields  
Δ𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿𝑔𝑡 + 𝜋′𝑍𝑖Δ log 𝑇𝐸𝐴𝑖𝑡−1  + (ν𝑖Δ log 𝑇𝐸𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 + Δ𝜀𝑖𝑡) 
= 𝛿𝑔𝑡 + ?̅?𝑖Δ log 𝑇𝐸𝐴𝑖𝑡−1  + 𝜂𝑖𝑡 
 
(7) 
For element j of vectors π and Zi, 𝜋𝑘 = 𝜕𝜕Δ𝑦𝑖𝑡 𝜕𝑍𝑖𝑗𝜕Δ log 𝑇𝐸𝐴𝑖𝑡−1⁄ , and thus the 
interaction coefficients modify the impact of deviations from optimal TEA on growth. 
When ?̅?𝑖 is positive (negative), 𝜋𝑘 > 0 implies that marginal increases in Zij increase 
(decrease) the magnitude of the growth penalty.  The composite error term η is clearly 
heteroskedastic and serially correlated, and therefore all inference will be based on 
standard errors calculated to be robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering at the 
country level. 
Our inclusion of few regressors other than TEA follows the approach of the 
                                                         
12 We model κ as time invariant because if it changes over time, then differencing equation (1) no 
longer removes the unobserved TEAi* from the estimating equation. 
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entrepreneurship literature (e.g., Audretsch et al. 2002).  However, the reader more 
familiar with the growth literature in macroeconomics will find specification (7) 
unusually parsimonious. Literally hundreds of other variables have appeared in growth 
regressions over the last three decades (Durlauf et al. 2005).  We do not include 
variables besides TEA, apart from those used to model heterogeneity in κi, for several 
reasons. First, the double differenced specification already controls for all factors 
influencing GDP or its growth rate that do not vary within a country.  Given the 
relatively short period under study, the specification is thus largely immune to bias from 
omission of slowly-evolving growth factors.  Second, the year×income group fixed 
effects control for all trending factors in the world economy that affect the growth of 
countries within the same stage of development equally. 
Finally, entrepreneurship is embedded in the fabric of a modern entrepreneurial 
economy, and the changing role of entrepreneurship is linked inextricably with change 
and restructuring in other parts of the economy.  Deregulation, privatization, 
globalization, and the widespread adoption of ICT have led to transformations in market 
exchange, competition, transactions among firms, and flexibility in production and input 
markets (Audretsch & Thurik 2001).  Entrepreneurship has co-evolved with these other 
phenomena, both benefiting from and contributing to them. By not including these 
other factors in our regressions, the estimated impact of our entrepreneurship variable 
will include not only the direct effect of TEA but also all the indirect effects of changes in 
the other factors prompted by entrepreneurship.  We thus caution the reader when 
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interpreting our coefficients related to TEA.13 
5 Results 
Table 3 presents the results of our empirical specifications, all of which are 
estimated by OLS on the differenced panel data.   
5.1 Homogeneous growth penalty 
Regression 1 is based on equation (4).  The estimate for κ is positive and 
statistically significant, implying that overall in the sample the entrepreneurship rate is 
below its optimum.  Although the coefficient looks small, the magnitude of the effect is 
not trivial.  The size of the estimate, 0.016, implies that each additional percentage 
point of relative deviation of TEA from its optimum is associated with a decrease in the 
growth rate of per capita real output of approximately 0.016 percentage points.  For 
example, consider a middle income country with output growing at the sample average 
for such countries of 2.5% per annum that has an optimal TEA of 15%.  If its actual TEA 
decreases from 13.5% to 12%, so that the relative deviation of TEA from TEA* increases 
from 10% to 20%, then output growth falls by 0.16 percentage points to 2.34% per 
annum.  That is a 6.4% decline in the growth rate, and the forgone growth in output per 
capita compounds over the years.   
                                                         
13 In particular, the coefficient on TEA is not to be read as the “causal impact on growth of increasing 
entrepreneurship while holding all else equal in the economy.”  Given how intertwined 
entrepreneurship is with other institutional and economic features of the modern economy, we do 
not find such a concept to be meaningful. 
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5.2 Growth penalty varying by income level 
In Regression 2, κ is allowed to vary with the initial income level of the country, as in 
equation (5).  The growth penalty decreases with the development level of the country 
and there evidence that entrepreneurship rates are too low only in low and middle 
income countries.14   The coefficient for high income countries is very small and 
insignificant, which (as discussed above) suggests that these countries have close to their 
optimal industrial structure.  The nations considered high-income by the start of our 
sample are those that led the way in adjusting their industrial structure to changes in the 
competitive and political environment—what Audretsch & Thurik (2000, 2001) call the 
replacement of the managed economy with the entrepreneurial economy.  Thus it is 
perhaps unsurprising that there is no evidence that high-income economies suffer a 
growth penalty from not having enough entrepreneurs. 15   The growth penalty 
coefficient for low income countries, 0.099, is between three and four times larger than 
the penalty for middle income countries.  Thus, the consequences for low income 
countries from having suboptimal industrial structure are greater than for other 
countries. 
                                                         
14 The small number of observations in the low income category required that we combine the yearly 
fixed effects for the low and middle income groups (i.e., we restrict δlow,t = δlmid,t in equation (5)) to 
enable calculation of the standard error for κlow.  This affects only this regression. 
15 Braunerhjelm et al. (2010) found, in contrast (albeit with a different sample of countries, definition 
of entrepreneurship, and econometric method) that as late as 2002 there was too little 
entrepreneurial activity in OECD countries. 
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5.3 Country-specific growth penalties: R&D capacity 
The final four regressions are based on equation (7) and model the heterogeneity of 
the growth penalty coefficient as a function of covariates.  To be consistent with 
equation (6), the time averages of the variables discussed in this subsection and the next 
are used (see footnote 12).  In regression 3, reported in Table 3, κ is a function of a 
constant and log RDworkers.  The coefficient on RDworkers (which is an element of π in 
equation (6)) is negative and highly significant.  To understand the implication of the 
negative sign, first recall that Regressions 1 and 2 show that κ is positive.  Thus, having 
more R&D capability in the economy reduces the magnitude of the growth penalty from 
having too few entrepreneurs.   
This finding is consistent with the theoretical model of Braunerhjelm et al. (2010), in 
which entrepreneurship and R&D are substitute determinants of growth and for which 
they find empirical support.16  Entrepreneurial start-ups typically do little or no R&D, 
but instead focus on developing new products, services, and business models 
(Braunerhjelm et al. 2010) and if necessary rely on the accumulated stock of knowledge 
developed by larger incumbent firms (Acs et al. 2009).  An economy with greater R&D 
capacity available for use by incumbents has more potential for growth from this avenue, 
and correspondingly suffers less of a penalty from a lack of entrepreneurs. 
                                                         
16 In their model, the marginal individual switching between entrepreneurship and R&D work has no 
impact on the balanced growth path. Thus, at least around the steady-state equilibrium in the 
economy, entrepreneurship and R&D are substitutes. 
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5.4 Country-specific growth penalties: Corruption and entrepreneurial 
capability 
In Regression 4, corruption and EshipAbility replace RDworkers as the covariates 
determining the growth penalty.17 The results, reported in Table 4, show that the 
coefficients on corruption and EshipAbility are positive and significant (although the 
latter is significant only at the 10% level).  Thus in lower income countries, where κ is 
positive, increased corruption is associated with a smaller growth penalty.  The finding 
suggests that in the second best situation in which such countries with too little 
entrepreneurship and weak institutions find themselves, corruption can blunt the impact 
of having too few entrepreneurs.  This is in accord with Méon and Weill’s (2010) 
empirical finding that corruption is less detrimental to—or may even 
improve—economic efficiency in countries where institutions are ineffective.   
LDCs tend to have high levels of corruption (see Table 2) and a higher growth 
penalty (refer to Regression 2). Even though corruption is expected to harm long term 
economic growth compared to the first best, it can improve small businesses’ 
productivity when institutions are defective. Aidt (2003) reviews the argument that 
corruption can increase efficiency to allocate resources through two channels. First, 
corruption speeds up the bureaucratic process--often referred to as “greasing the wheels” 
of commerce. Second, corruption introduces competition for scarce government 
                                                         
17 We do not include all three variables in the same regression because there are several missing 
observations for RDworkers and also because the correlation between RDworkers and the two new 
covariates, corruption and EshipAbility, is high enough to cause concerns about multicollinearity. 
|  P a g e  2 0   
resources, resulting in the more efficient provision of services than otherwise would 
obtain. Either reason may explain our finding that corruption ameliorates the growth 
penalty.   
To test further the hypothesis that corruption greases the wheels for 
entrepreneurship, in Regression 5 we allow the coefficient for the interaction of TEA and 
Corruption to vary by income group. If a role of corruption is to improve the ability of 
entrepreneurs to start and grow new businesses in countries with weak institutions, then 
the impact of corruption on the growth penalty should be greatest in low income 
countries and least in high income countries.  This is indeed the case, as Regression 5 
shows.  The coefficients on the interactions between TEA, corruption, and income 
group are all positive and rise as income falls.  Our results for the impact of corruption 
are similar in spirit to other recent empirical work.  Dreher & Gassebner (2011) find 
that corruption reduces the negative impact of regulations on entrepreneurship in highly 
regulated economies.  Vial & Hanoteau (2010) study plant-level data from Indonesia 
and also find evidence supporting that corruption greases the wheels.  
The positive coefficient for EshipAbility signifies that untapped entrepreneurial 
capability increases the opportunity cost of not having enough entrepreneurs. For 
marginal increases in entrepreneurship to improve economic growth, there must be a 
pool of individuals capable of starting and growing new business ventures. When more 
people believe they have valuable business skills, it is likely that the marginal 
entrepreneur who did not create a start-up is indeed more talented and would have 
contributed even more to GDP growth.  Our finding is in accord with the large literature 
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emphasizing the links between the capabilities of firms to create new knowledge, the 
development of organizational capabilities within the firm, and subsequent firm and 
economic performance.18 
In Regression 6, the interactions between the income group and log TEA (δgt from 
equation (4)) are added to the specification from Regression 4 to check for omitted 
variable bias.  The coefficients and significance levels for the interactions with 
corruption and EshipAbility change little. 
5.5 Country-specific growth penalties: A closer look 
Using the results of Regression 6, we can (with reference to equation (6)) compute 
the mean growth penalty coefficient for each country as ?̅??̂? = ?̂?′𝑍𝑖. Figure 2 contains the 
distribution of the country-specific estimates, ranging from small and negative values of 
?̅??̂? on the left to larger and positive values on the right. As suggested by the results of 
Regression 2, the countries represented closer to the left side of the graph, where the 
coefficients are small and mostly insignificant,19 are generally more developed countries. 
All but 13 estimates, out of 51, have positive κ, and the only two that are significantly 
negative are Finland and Denmark, both highly developed countries. In 22 out of 51 
countries, κ is significant at the 5% level; in 29 countries, it is significant at the 10% 
level. 
                                                         
18 Refer to the literature review in Zhang, Tansuhaj, and McCullough (2009) for citations. 
19 The vertical bars are the 95% confidence intervals for the point estimates, and insignificance can be 
determined by the interval spanning the horizontal line at zero. 
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The relationship between the level of development of the country and the growth 
penalty coefficient is further explored in Figure 3.  The curve in the figure is a smoothed 
scatterplot of initial GDPPC and the estimated ?̅?𝑖 from Regression 6.  The figure shows 
that not only is there heterogeneity in the growth penalty across income levels, but that 
there is additional heterogeneity in ?̅?𝑖 within income groups.  For example, on the 
right side of the figure there is a cluster of high income countries with widely varying κ.  
This shows the importance of the other factors besides income—corruption and 
entrepreneurial capability—in the link between industry structure and growth. 
6 Discussion and Conclusions  
The results above uncover a conundrum.  LDCs have more entrepreneurs than 
wealthier countries.  At the same time, the estimations suggest that LDCs need more 
entrepreneurs while high-income countries do not. How are we to reconcile the 
apparent contradiction?  The answer lies in the fact that although we cannot observe or 
estimate20 the optimal industry structure in each country, there are several reasons to 
expect that the best rate of entrepreneurship for developed countries is lower than for 
LDCs.  As discussed in section 2.1, economic theory predicts that the average size of 
firms increases with progressive economic development (Lucas 1978; Iyigun & Owen 
1998). Given that LDCs have lower capital per worker ratios than developed countries, 
the Lucas hypothesis can explain why the optimal entrepreneurship rates in LDCs are 
                                                         
20 Recall that TEAi* drops out of the estimating equation after differencing. 
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higher than in more developed countries. 
Furthermore, Pagano & Schivardi (2003) explain that in developed economies, larger 
firms can take advantage of economies of scale and scope in R&D. The case is the 
opposite in LDCs.  Without strong technical, managerial, and organizational capability 
to exploit large-scale R&D opportunities, large firms in LDCs enjoy less of an advantage 
over smaller firms. It may also be the case that large incumbents are less efficient in LDCs 
if their market position was motivated by rent seeking and gained through political 
patronage, cronyism, or capture of regulators.21  Therefore, even though LDCs have 
higher entrepreneurship rates, it is entirely possible their optimal industry structure 
requires even more small firms.  
 In this paper, we have analyzed the impact of being above or below the optimal rate 
of entrepreneurship on economic growth. The study provides empirical evidence that 
low and middle income countries do not have enough entrepreneurs while most 
developed countries appear to be close to an optimal industry structure.  Given that 
our sample includes only three low income countries, our results for that group may not 
be representative, and we await further data as GEM continues to expand its coverage.  
Regardless, the growth penalty is also heterogeneous in dimensions other than income. 
In countries where R&D capability is higher, deviating from the optimal rate of 
entrepreneurship does not reduce economic growth as much as in countries with less 
                                                         
21 Emerson (2002) shows in a rent-seeking model of imperfect competition that the higher the degree 
of corruption, the fewer and larger are the firms in the formal sector of the economy and the lower is 
social welfare. 
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capacity for R&D. This suggests that entrepreneurship and R&D can be alternative factors 
for national growth.  A high level of corruption decreases the cost of lacking 
entrepreneurs in developing nations. Indeed, in places where formal institutions are 
weak, corruption is one of the few ways available to speed up transactions and can thus 
a positive factor for doing business. The opportunity cost of having too few 
entrepreneurs rises with a high level of perceived capabilities.  
Our results should not be viewed as reducing the relationship between 
entrepreneurship and growth to a mechanistic process.  Not every entrepreneur will 
innovate or create jobs and wealth in communities (Shane, 2009).  Nevertheless, it is 
important that policy makers in LDCs learn from those in developed countries, who have 
responded to the changing role of the entrepreneur in the last few decades by 
promoting new formation of businesses with high potential for growth (Thurik et al. 
2002; Reynolds et al. 2000). As Audretsch & Thurik (2001) point out, the large 
opportunity cost we find for LDCs for their slow adjustment to the optimal industry 
structure has alarming consequences for forgone growth.  Whether through explicit 
policy to encourage entrepreneurship (Gilbert et al. 2004) or through reforming the 
myriad related policies that discourage entrepreneurship indirectly (Baumol et al. 2009), 
policy makers can promote innovation and remove roadblocks to national economic 
growth. 
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Figure 1:  Entrepreneurship Rates in the Estimation Sample, by Income Class  
 
 
Figure 2:  The Distribution of Country-Specific Growth Penalty Coefficients  
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Figure 3:  The Relationship between Growth Penalty Coefficient and Income  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Countries Included in the Study 
Low Income Countries 
India, Serbia, Uganda 
Middle Income Countries 
Argentina, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Croatia, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Latvia, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Poland, Romania, 
Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Slovenia, South Africa, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay 
High Income Countries 
Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Iceland, Ireland, 
Israel, Italy, Japan, S. Korea, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States    
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Table 2: Summary Statistics by Income Level 
 Low Income  Middle Income  High Income 
Variable Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D. 
Δlog(GDPPC)  0.028 0.032  0.025 0.047  0.011 0.029 
TEA 16.90   11.03  10.70 6.578  6.477 3.208 
Δlog(TEA) 0.005 0.302  0.008 0.311  0.012 0.307 
Corruption  1.174 0.188  0.771 0.440  -0.619 0.771 
EshipAbility 66.52 12.97  50.93 13.18  40.89 10.79 
log(RDworker) 5.630 1.155  6.579 0.976  8.214 0.412 
Notes:  Data cover 2001-2011.  Refer to  
 
 
 
Table 1 to see which countries are included in each income group. 
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Table 3: Differenced OLS Regression Results for Real GDP Growth 
Regressor 
Regression 1  
(Eqn. 4) 
Regression 2  
(Eqn. 5) 
Regression 3  
(Eqn. 7) 
Δlog(TEAit-1) 0.016  0.157 
 (0.007)**  (0.052)*** 
Δlog(TEAit-1) × HighIncome  0.004  
  (0.004)  
Δlog(TEAit-1) × MiddleIncome  0.027  
  (0.014)*  
Δlog(TEAit-1) × LowIncome  0.099  
  (0.042)**  
Δlog(TEAit-1) × log(RDworkers)   -0.019 
   (0.006)*** 
Constant 0.031 0.031 0.009 
 (0.003)*** (0.030) (0.010) 
Year × income group interactions Yes Yes Yes 
F statistic for coefficients involving 
TEA 
5.53 5.60 4.60 
F statistic d.o.f. and p-value (1, 52); 
p = 0.023 
(3,52); 
p = 0.002 
(2,46); p = 
0.015 
R2 0.632 0.630 0.649 
Adjusted R2 0.596 0.600 0.615 
N 271 271 257 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Table notes:  the dependent variable is ΔΔlog(GDPPCit). Standard errors are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and clustering on country. 
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Table 4: Further Differenced OLS Regression Results for Real GDP Growth 
Regressor 
Regression 4  
(Eqn. 7) 
Regression 5  
(Eqn. 7) 
Regression 6  
(Eqn. 7) 
Δlog(TEAit-1) -0.027 -0.026 -0.027 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) 
Δlog(TEAit-1) × HighIncome    
    
Δlog(TEAit-1) × MiddleIncome   0.001 
   (0.014) 
Δlog(TEAit-1) × LowIncome   0.056 
   (0.018)*** 
Δlog(TEAit-1) × Corruption 0.018  0.018 
 (0.007)**  (0.006)*** 
Δlog(TEAit-1) × Corruption ×   0.013  
HighIncome  (0.006)**  
Δlog(TEAit-1) × Corruption ×   0.026  
MiddleIncome  (0.016)  
Δlog(TEAit-1) × Corruption ×   0.076  
LowIncome  (0.017)***  
Δlog(TEAit-1) × EshipAbility 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.000)* (0.000) (0.000)* 
Constant 0.021 -0.005 -0.004 
 (0.006)*** (0.006) (0.006) 
Year × income group interactions Yes Yes Yes 
F statistic for coefficients 
involving TEA 
3.32 14.77 17.09 
F statistic d.o.f. and p-value (3,50); 
p = 0.027 
(5,50); 
p = 0.000 
(5,50); 
p = 0.000 
R2 0.656 0.657 0.656 
Adjusted R2 0.620 0.619 0.619 
N 267 267 267 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
See notes to previous table. 
 
